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Empirical data indicate that the so-called “Buddhism of yellow color” that 
is predominantly associated with Japanese “immigrant” Buddhism, is con-
stantly in decline in terms of “explicit” adherents. After some methodological 
observations, this article gives an overview of the relevant statistical data. The 
last part discusses possible reasons for these negative dynamics, referring to 
causes within Buddhist institutions, the ethnic community, and at the level of 
the individual. 
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Unlike Western countries such as Germany, where Buddhism was introduced from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards through the efforts of a handful of occidental protagonists especially 
interested in Theravada Buddhism (Usarski 1989), the history of Buddhism in 
Brazil was initiated with the arrival of the first Japanese (mostly of rural origin) 
in the port of Santos in 1908. For many decades thereafter, Japanese immigrant 
Buddhism, not exclusively (Nakamaki 2002) but predominantly in the form 
of Amida Buddhism, continued to be the only expression of Buddhism in the 
so-called largest Catholic country in the world. Moreover, at the beginning of 
the 1960s the traditional Soto Zen temple Busshinji, in the city of São Paulo, 
became the first and primary source for a small circle of non-Japanese pioneers 
interested in the practice of zazen (Rocha 2006, 78). The same institution was 
for some time the spiritual home of perhaps the symbolic figure of the Brazilian 
branch of “conversion Buddhism,” Cláudia Souza de Murayama, alias “Monja 
Coen” (Usarski 2006). Finally, in order to evaluate the influence of Japanese 
immigration on Brazilian Buddhism in general, one must not forget the high 
proportion of Pure Land and Nichiren Buddhist temples and centers within 
about three hundred Buddhist entities in Brazil, while keeping in mind that the 
Brazilian field has become as pluralistic as that of other countries (see figure 1).
Problematization 
Headlines such as “Buddhism is leaving the temples,”1 flanked by repeatedly 
published “news” in the Brazilian media regarding a supposed “boom” of the 
Brazilian sangha,2 suggest that, after decades of relative encapsulation, tradi-
tional Japanese Buddhism has successfully gone through a process of accul-
turation and turned into a “trendy” religion. This optimistic image was severely 
challenged by an article published on 19 January 2001 by the weekly maga-
zine Isto é whose title “Don’t let Buddhism disappear from Brazil” did not fit 
at all with previous reports about the almost inevitable advance of Buddhism. 
According to the article, the urgent issue, at least among representatives of 
1. A quote from the headline of the main article “Além do templo - O budismo atrai mais adep-
tos no Brasil e seus seguidores assumem práticas engajadas” in the weekly magazine Isto É, 1 Octo-
ber 2003.
2. To quote just four examples: “O Brasil dos Budas” (The Brazil of the Buddhas), Isto É, March 
1997; “Onda Zen” (The Success of Zen), Elle, June 1998; “O Budismo conquista o Brasil” (Buddhism 
conquers Brazil), Corpo & Mente, October 2000; “A ascensão do budismo no Brasil” (The Rise of 
Buddhism in Brazil), Época, June 2003.
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traditional Japanese Buddhists institutions, was not how to respond to a dra-
matic increase of conversions or to overcrowded sessions, retreats, and work-
shops, but to declining communities and internal difficulties such as the lack of 
staff in certain local temples. 
While many readers might have been taken by surprise by these “revela-
tions,” the Isto é report is not only in tune with similar statements from within 
traditional Japanese Buddhist communities, but also in line with the results of 
empirical research on the subject. One example for a pessimistic “emic” evalua-
tion of the current situation of Japanese Buddhism is the statement of an official 
of the Comunidade Budista Nichirenshu of São Paulo, who, in 1995, had already 
emphasized that “There are many, both within and outside the Japanese com-
munity, who think that Buddhism is only for older people, and that monks 
fulfill their functions only in terms of funeral rites” (Federação das Seitas 
Budistas do Brasil 1995, 42). And in 2004 a leading Jodo Shinshu minister of 
São Paulo added that 
When it comes to religious practice, one can easily notice that the descendents 
of immigrants are not very interested in what is happening in a Buddhist 
temple. They are more concerned with integrating themselves into Brazilian 
society than in maintaining the traditions of their ancestors. Therefore it is not 
an exaggeration to say that when the last immigrant dies, the only thing for 
the Buddhist missionaries to do is to close the temples and return to Japan. It 
would be convenient to turn off the light before leaving for the airport.
(Gonçalves 2004)
Others 5%
Shingon 2%
Ecumenic 3%
Theravada 2%
Nichiren 34%
Chan/Pure Land 
(Chinese) 4%
Shin 24%
Zen 10%
Vajrayana 16%
figure 1. Proportions of Buddhist institutions in Brazil 
(Shoji 2004, 34) 
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As far as empirical research is concerned, the results of the last national cen-
suses provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) are 
especially relevant. Nonetheless, when it comes to a closer look at “immigration 
Buddhism,” the IBGE studies must be interpreted with caution. The most crucial 
point here is the category of “color” or “race.” In the census’s questionnaire this 
appears as a fivefold-differentiated option to be correlated with other categories, 
including those subsumed under the heading “religion.” As for the identification 
of “immigrant Buddhists” the sub-category in the rubric “color” that spontane-
ously comes to mind is “yellow.” However, this is obviously an ambiguous asso-
ciation for epistemological, methodological, and political reasons. 
The main argument against an overly ingenuous interpretation of the IBGE 
data is that the identification of a person’s color in the census derives from the 
self-declaration of an interviewee confronted with a concept that is not only 
vague but also has negative connotations. This being the case, it is by no means 
guaranteed that someone with an Asian background is in fact willing to agree 
that he is a Brazilian of “yellow color.” From an ethical-political point of view, 
the discomfort with the color/race question is caused by the implicit quality 
ranking of the suggested sub-categories of the item. Although it is true that the 
days of the overt proclamation of the ideal of a gradual “whitening” of Brazilian 
society and of racial stigmatization are over (Sasaki 2006, 100), more subtle 
social mechanisms, still capable of putting members of ethnic minorities under 
pressure, have prevailed. This is indicated by personal statements such as the 
following: “The Japanese always encountered resistance from the Brazilian side. 
Their strange customs sometimes provoked laughter […] fear […] or mistrust” 
(Azevedo 1994, 47). Analysts like Maeyama, opposing the image of Brazil as an 
exceptionally tolerant country, even speak of a tacit atmosphere of  “cultural prej-
udice” that demands members “of different cultures, peoples, and ways of think-
ing” to “assimilate themselves into Luso-Brazilian culture which is commonly 
supposed to be the only ‘legitimate’ Brazilian culture” (Maeyama 1983a, 167). 
If this observation is adequate, one has to take into account the possibility 
that a descendent of a Japanese immigrant family has internalized this latent 
expectation of his/her “complete” assimilation into Brazil’s mainstream culture 
and therefore judges the option “yellow” in the IBGE questionnaire as inap-
propriate since it does not reflect his/her efforts to become a fully integrated 
member of the Brazilian society. This is especially true for individuals born to 
ethnically mixed parents. However, the rejection of the subcategory “yellow” as 
a description of one’s own status does not necessarily imply that the interviewee 
has gotten rid of the self-concept of “Nippo-Brazilian.” Rather it would signal 
that in relation to the “Nippo” aspect of his/her “composed” individuality the 
“Brazilian” component has gained the upper hand. 
Empirical data proves the pertinence of the above considerations. Due to both 
procreation and to a continuous flow of Japanese immigrants until 1973, com-
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plemented by the Immigration of Chinese and Koreans from the 1950s onwards, 
the number of Brazilians with an Asian family background has increased con-
stantly over the decades. As a consequence of these dynamics, it is estimated 
that currently more than 1.5 million Brazilians are of Asian origin, most of them 
(about 1.28 million) Japanese immigrants and their descendants (Tsuda 2000, 
3). Figures provided by the IBGE show that, between 1980 and 2000, those of 
Japanese descent alone represented between 0.7 percent and 0.8 percent of the 
total Brazilian population (Beltrão, sugahara and konta 2006). However, 
the percentage of individuals predisposed to identify themselves as “yellow” did 
not correspond to these values (figure 2). 
Summing up, one has to bear in mind that correlating the variables “Bud-
dhism” and “yellow” is heuristically limited in at least two ways. First, while Bra-
zilian Buddhists who are not reluctant to identify themselves as “yellow” can be 
considered as adherents with an Asian family background, they are not neces-
sarily Japanese descendents. Nonetheless, according to the numerical propor-
tions between the nationalities in question (Japanese, Chinese, Korean), the 
numbers of Buddhists “of yellow color” do not lose their relevance in research 
on Japanese Buddhism in particular, as long as they are interpreted as predomi-
nant statistical tendencies within a wider context. 
Second, in order to reduce the risk of distortion, one should be prepared for 
the possibility that a certain proportion of Brazilian Buddhists of Japanese ori-
gin appear in the statistics under a rubric other than that of Buddhists of “yel-
low color.” With this in mind, the following section deals with the dynamics in 
both sub-fields of Brazilian Buddhism. 
The Statistical Evolution of “Buddhism of Yellow Color” in Brazil 
In 2000 only about 0.14 percent of the Brazilian population opted for the rubric 
“Buddhism” in the IBGE questionnaire. That is quite a modest value even if com-
figure 2. Population of Brazil according to color or race (%)  
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística IBGE) 
White Black Yellow Mulatto Indigenous
1940 63.47 14.64 0.59 21.21 -
1950 61.66 10.96 0.63 26.54 -
1960 61.03 8.71 0.69 29.50 -
1980 54.23 5.92 0.56 38.85 -
1991 51.56 5.00 0.43 42.45 0.20
2000 53.74 6.21 0.45 38.45 0.43
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pared to the number of adherents of religious minorities such as the Adventists (0.73 
percent) or Jehovah’s Witnesses (0.6 percent). A comparison of the last national 
censuses also negates the widespread idea that Buddhism is a constantly growing 
religion (figure 3). The opposite is true, especially when one discards a relative 
distinction between ethnic Buddhism and the Buddhism of converts (Numrich 
1996) and takes into account the negative dynamics of the Buddhist field in gen-
eral between 1991 (236,405 Buddhists) and 2000 (214,873 Buddhists). 
This recent decline of the total number of Brazilian Buddhists not only con-
tradicts the numerical exaggerations common in the Brazilian media, but also 
indicates that one should not count on the possibility that a considerable num-
ber of “Nippo-Brazilians”who had refused to continue to declare themselves 
“yellow” in 2000 now appear under the rubric “Non-Yellow-Buddhist.” 
The negative dynamics in the subfield becomes even clearer when one consid-
ers the evolution of the segment “Buddhists of yellow color” over the last three 
decades. Compared to the 149,633 “Buddhists of yellow color” registered in 1970, 
the number of self-declared Buddhists of “yellow color” had dropped to 81,345 
in 2000. That is a decline of 68,288 individuals of Asian origin predisposed to 
identify themselves as adherents of the religion of their forefathers. Comple-
mentary data from 1950—when 152,572 Buddhists were counted prior both to 
the first manifestations of converts to Buddhism in Brazil and to the statistically 
significant Chinese and Korean immigration to the country—proves that the 
decline of “Buddhism of yellow color” was an ongoing process throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. However, the loss between 1950 and 1970 
(2,939) was relatively unimportant and not comparable with the far more dra-
matic decrease of 59,692 individuals that occurred between 1970 and 1991. 
From the standpoint of some representatives of traditional Japanese religious 
institutions, the situation in the local temples is even more worrying than that 
expressed by the modest numbers of “Buddhists of yellow color” at the national 
level. In 2004, the Reverend of the Apucarana Nambei Honganji in Apucarana, 
in the State of Paraná, lamented: “If we asked any of the hundreds of frequent 
visitors who flock to the temples on the weekend if they consider themselves to 
be Buddhists at all, we would be alarmed. Less than one percent of the visitors 
declare themselves to be Buddhists.”3 Another indication that the real situation 
is quite different from the stereotypical rhetoric of a “boom” in Buddhism is the 
modest situation of the Busshinji temple in the city of São Paulo. According to a 
local authority, only some thirty people, most of them non-Japanese Brazilians, 
regularly attend the institution’s meetings.4 
3. Message posted in the discussion list buddismo@topica.com. Accessed 23 September 2004.
4. cf. http://www.ipcdigital.com/print_news.asp?descrIdioma=br&codNoticia=7538. Accessed 
15 December 2007.
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The Decline of “Buddhism of Yellow Color” 
from a Socio-Historical and Demographical Perspective
The practice of traditional Japanese religion was generally an improvised affair 
within  families or, at best, among like-minded neighbors (Usarski, ed. 2002). 
This was due to restrictions on overt religious activities followed by the Japa-
nese government in respect for the feelings of the predominantly Catholic Bra-
zilian population, and also because of the desire of the immigrants to prosper 
quickly and return to their homeland as soon as possible. Occurring only in the 
1950s, a general “resurrection” of Japanese religion (Mori 1992) initially favored 
the rapid institutionalization of traditional Japanese Buddhist temples in those 
urban surroundings to which a great number of immigrants, previously concen-
trated in rural zones, had begun to move in search of economic opportunities. 
However, the consolidation of Buddhism and urban migration represented two 
not fully congruent dynamics. On the one hand newly founded temples offered 
a space for social reintegration and the preservation of transplanted cultural 
capital. On the other hand, the shift from demographically “dense” colonies to 
socio-structural and ideologically heterogeneous cities implied the weakening 
of the plausibility structure that had been collectively constructed according to 
traditional Japanese values. 
This discrepancy was already evident by the end of the 1950s, the decade in 
which a series of Japanese Buddhist institutions were inaugurated in Brazil. 
According to relevant studies, when immigration began, only a minority of the 
Japanese who settled in Brazil were Christians (Fujii and Smith 1959, 14). Data 
from 1958 draws a completely different picture. At that time, only 44.5 percent 
of Japanese living in Brazil still felt committed to their traditional religion, a 
dramatic change that was particularly significant in urban surroundings, where 
figure 4. Religious preference among Japanese immigrants in percent (1958) (Maeyama 1973, 248)
Brazil (%) Rural context Urban context Metropolitan context
Buddhism Catholicism Other
44.0 42.8
27.7
50.1
36.5
13.4
37.9
50.3
11.8
37.7
48.9
13.4
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50.3percent had already converted to Catholicism, while in rural areas the cor-
responding value was 36.5 percent (figure 4).
Complementary data indicate that, in the same year, the tendency to abandon 
traditional Japanese religion was stronger among the younger members of the 
Japanese immigrant community (figure 5). While more than two-thirds of the 
immigrants born in Japan declared themselves to be Buddhists, this percentage 
had dropped dramatically to 29.9 percent among the following generation born 
in Brazil, and to only 19 percent in the third generation (Maeyama 1973, 248). 
The long-term consequences of the difficulties in maintaining traditional 
Buddhism within families of Japanese origin is mirrored by relevant data 
derived from the National Census conducted in 1950 and in 2000. 
In 2000, despite an increase of about 15 percent in Brazil’s population over 
the 1990s, 45.13 percent of “Buddhists of yellow color” were older than 60 while 
only 12.19 percent were younger than 20. The significance of these proportions 
becomes clear if one compares these values with corresponding figures pro-
vided by the IBGE in 1950, indicating an inverse relation to that time, when the 
majority (51.52 percent) of “Buddhists of yellow color” were younger than 20, 
while less than 5 percent were older than 60 (figure 6). 
Figure 6. “Buddhism of yellow color” according to age groups in 1950 and 2000 (in percent).  
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)
30.58
20.94
15.23
12.00
1.00
3.64
7.42
9.204.42
7.77 9.03
9.06
13.92
18.35
26.78
10.67
1950 2000
>=10 years >20, <=30>10, <=20 >30, <=40 >40, <=50 >50, <=60 >60, <=70 >70 years
figure 5: Buddhist affiliation over three 
generations (%) (Maeyama 1973, 248).
First Generation (%) Second Generation (%) Third Generation (%)
70.6
29.9
19.0
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According to the theoretical assumption that a religion “must maintain a 
level of fertility sufficient to at least offset member mortality” in order to survive 
(Stark 1996, 140) this evolution poses a major challenge for a religious commu-
nity incapable of attracting non-Japanese descendents. 
Causes for the Decline of “Buddhism of Yellow Color” in Brazil 
The following discussion of possible causes for the decline of “Buddhism of yel-
low color” in Brazil is organized according to three “levels” of reflection. 
The first level consists of the identification of dysfunctional elements on the 
part of Japanese Buddhist institutions. The second level corresponds to prob-
lems of maintaining and transmitting religious heritage within the ethnic com-
munity. Aspects primarily associated with individuals are located on the third 
level. Needless to say, these three levels are intimately related empirically and 
this distinction is made for analytical purposes only.
deficits at the level of buddhist institutions 
Theorists favoring rational explanations suggest that religious demand gener-
ally does not develop in a “vacuum” but as a positive response to manifest sup-
plies provided by competing local religious institutions (Finke 1997). Seen from 
this angle, Buddhism in general and Japanese Buddhism in particular is not in 
a very comfortable position in Brazil, simply because the majority of its institu-
tions are concentrated in the south-east and the south of the country, that is, 
in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul (figure 7), that is, 
in those federal states that for decades have been preferred by Japanese immi-
grants and their descendents.
Although geographical accessibility to the physical facilities of a religion is an 
important prerequisite for success in a religious market, “suppliers” clearly need 
more than mere geographical presence in order to keep up with competitors. 
In this sense, even if a local institution runs traditional Japanese Buddhism, it 
generally suffers from two major infrastructural limitations: first, the concentra-
tion of the temple activities in the hands of only a few individuals; and, second, 
the lack of a consistent strategy in general, and of linguistic competence in par-
ticular, that would be capable of attracting a wider audience, not only from out-
side but also from inside the ethnic Japanese context. Both aspects are addressed 
by a Honpa Honganji minister who, now back in Japan, looks back to his time in 
Brazil, and complains: “The Japanese authorities in the temple are not only inca-
pable of transmitting the religious heritage to the young Nikkei, they are also 
unwilling to share their responsibility with any Brazilian. That is the reason why 
today only Japanese-speaking adherents frequent the temples. All this reminds 
me of an old people’s home.”5
5. Quote from an email message sent by Kyoya Imai on 11 September 2007.
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The first part of the above criticism emphasizes the lack of space offered to 
Brazilians willing to engage themselves in temple affairs. This aspect has been 
academically discussed in reference to the hypothesis of the co-existence of two 
more or less “incompatible” congregations in traditional temples, that is, where a 
“parallel” group of converted Buddhists is involved. This constellation has nega-
tive effects for the future of ethnic Buddhism in Brazil, as indicated by the fol-
lowing words of a Brazilian Nichiren Shoshu authority: “Generally, monks from 
Japan come with the pretension to teach Buddhism here as a philosophy or as a 
Japanese ideology. But I do not think that this works. This is a land of Samba, of 
beaches, of Carnival. This is not Japan. The philosophy might come from there, 
but we have to adapt it to local conditions” (Federação das Seitas Budistas 
do Brasil 1995, 42).
A more fundamental problem exists when, due to the lack of religious “man-
power,” a community is left without a resident religious authority, hence without 
a regular weekly schedule. One concrete example is the Honpa Honganji branch, 
which runs about forty-five institutions. However, only the headquarters in the 
city of São Paulo has religious staff, while, for example, more than twenty com-
munities in the interior of the state6 and three in the Federal State of Paraná7 do 
not enjoy the permanent presence of a local reverend and, instead of maintain-
ing regular temple activities, depend on the visits of a religious authority from 
another city in order to be properly attended. 
figure 7. Geographic distribution of Buddhist institutions in Brazil (Shoji 2004, 35)
6. In Bernardo do Campo, Álvares Machado, Adamantina, Andradina, Cafelândia, Dracena, 
Flórida Paulista, Guararapes, Itu, Junqueirópolis, Lucélia, Mirandópolis, Osvaldo Cruz, Pacaembu, 
Piedade, Pilar do Sul, Pereira Barreto, Pompéia, São José dos Campos, Tremembé, Tupi Paulista, and 
Votuporanga.
7. In Curitiba, Mandaguari, and Paranavaí.
Paraná 10%
Rio Grande do Sul 5%
Minas Gerais 4%
Distrito Federal 3%
Outros 16%
São Paulo 51%
Rio de Janerio 11%
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The second infrastructural deficit is the lack of a consistent strategy in gen-
eral, and in particular, of linguistic competence. These can be regarded as long-
term consequences of the historical circumstances under which “immigration 
Buddhism” was introduced to Brazil, at a time when Japanese immigrants were 
still convinced that their residence in their host country would be temporary. In 
accordance with this attitude, until the 1950s the majority of Japanese Buddhist 
schools refrained from adequately organizing themselves. This was counter-
productive in terms not only of internal consolidation and external expansion, 
but also of the experiences of what it meant to systematically transplant an eth-
nically differentiated non-Christian religion into a predominantly Catholic, 
Portuguese-speaking society. If subsequent efforts were made in order to com-
pensate for these failures, they were insufficient. This is especially true in terms 
of continuing linguistic restrictions, as indicated by the following statement:
The starting point of efficient missionary work in Brazilian territory should be 
... a clear-sighted translation of the basic religious texts of this school into Por-
tuguese. It is essential to undertake this task with a certain urgency, because 
Japanese immigration ended some time ago. The old immigrants who under-
stood Japanese are dead, and most of their descendants are not familiar with 
the language of their ancestors.... If, in this respect, nothing is done quickly, 
the mission could be forced to put an end to its activities at the moment the 
last Japanese immigrant to Brazil leaves this world. 
(Gonçalves 1995, 9) 
Problems of Maintaining Traditional Religiosity Within the Ethnic Community 
The direction taken by the assimilation of an immigrant group in its new sur-
roundings is a function of two contradictory logics: the desire to maintain the 
cultural heritage brought to the country of immigration; and the demand for 
integration according to the patterns of the host society. 
During the first decades of immigration, the cultivation of traditional Japa-
nese values in favor of the cohesion of the family and solidarity among its mem-
bers was not only an expression of the immigrants’ intention to stay in Brazil 
only as long as necessary, but also a means of strengthening the group’s collec-
tive identity as a means of combating strong external anti-Japanese sentiments 
(Stadniky 2001). 
After World War II, this “inward” orientation was increasingly challenged as 
the host society offered economic opportunities in exchange for assimilation. 
Socio-demographic mobility in response to these opportunities contributed 
both to the growing flexibility of communication patterns and disfavor of the 
Japanese language, and to the expansion of social networks beyond the ethnic 
enclave. Both dynamics affected the plausibility structure that had formerly 
facilitated the maintenance and transmission of collective cultural heritage, 
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including Buddhism traditionally practiced as “the religion of the household 
inherited from the family ancestors” (Maeyama 1983b, 206). 
The negative impact of the language shift has to do with the fact that lan-
guage is the basic tool of expressing, preserving, and transmitting one’s culture, 
hence an instrument of critical importance for keeping the family’s religious 
memory alive. Seen from this angle, and remembering the paucity of religious 
material translated into Portuguese, one can interpret the gradual decline of the 
Japanese language in Brazil a result of the parent’s failure of transmitting it to 
their children. 
While this process became more obvious during the 1950s, empirical studies 
prove a corresponding tendency as early as the 1940s, a time of rigid political 
figure 8. Maintenance of language and religion in 1940 (percent)  
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 1951, 48–79)  
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measures imposed by the nationalistic regime of Getúlio Vargas, including the 
revision of immigration laws, a compulsory assimilation program for foreign-
ers, and the prohibition of the public use of foreign languages.
Relevant statistics can be found in an early IBGE study on demographical 
characteristics of four Japanese immigration “colonies” located in the state of 
São Paulo. As the figure below indicates, by 1940 a significant number of immi-
grants and their descendents had already abandoned their traditional religion, a 
tendency most accentuated among community members younger than twenty. 
However, this predisposition was less significant in the Tupã colony where some 
98 percent still preferred Japanese as the principal means of communication. In 
opposition, the highest percentage of individuals who had abandoned Japanese 
religions were found in Presidente Prudente, a finding that is not only positively 
correlated with the relatively low percentage of colony members sticking to 
their original language, but also with the relatively low percentage of individuals 
handicapped by difficulties of speaking Portuguese fluently. 
According to later studies, in 1988 less than forty-five percent of the Brazilian 
descendents of Japanese immigrants used Portuguese at home while thirty-three 
percent had no knowledge of the language of their ancestors. This tendency was 
most accentuated in urban surroundings, where the percentage of Portuguese 
speaking Nikkei was 66.25 percent while only 6 percent were still speaking elab-
orate Japanese (Carvalho 2003, 39–40). This trend is in sharp contrast to the 
ongoing dominance of the Japanese language in traditional Japanese temples. 
In addition to the religious side effects resulting from the shift from Japa-
nese to Portuguese as the principal language of a constantly growing number 
of “Nippo-Brazilians,” efforts to maintain cultural capital within the colonies 
were challenged by an increase in interethnic marriages, hence by a practice that 
“reflects an abandonment of a preference for one’s own ethnic group” and repre-
sents “a means to challenge the traditional family system” (Carvalho 2003, 41).
Until the 1940s, interethnic marriage was a rare option for Japanese immi-
grants. Less than two percent of the community members born in Japan and 
less than six percent of the Nikkeis were married to a partner of non-Japanese 
origin (Lesser 1999, 104). After World War II the situation changed gradually. 
Although a strong hesitation against interethnic marriage persisted on a col-
lective level, socioeconomic factors including the family status of the potential 
bride or groom’s heritage were often capable of overcoming the parents’ resis-
tance, even if their children saw inter-marriage as an opportunity “to ‘erase’ their 
Japanese traits” (Carvalho 2003, 41). As a result, at the end of the 1950s and 
the beginning of the 1960s the rate of interethnic marriage  for those of Japa-
nese descent was 18.36 percent for males and 7.63 percent for females. According 
to more recent data, today interethnic marriage is more the norm rather than 
the exception. In 1988 more than 49.5 percent of “Nippo-Brazilians” nationwide 
were married to a partner of non-Japanese descent (Carvalho 2003, 43). 
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The negative role of this growing trend for the maintenance of traditional cul-
tural capital within the Japanese community is obvious. Ethnic inter-marriage, 
being both racially and ideologically a “mixed zone,” demands mutual respect 
from the couple and concessions towards their respective inherited convictions 
and values of their partners. This is in contrast to an ethnically homogeneous 
family, whose generally dense plausibility structure protects them from the 
experience of religious contingency and offers a framework for the more or less 
coherent transmission of a traditional world view. The reconstruction of social 
reality within the newly formed family may lead to a critical reconsideration of 
religious matters previously supposed to be self-evident as well as “negotiations” 
over the correct course of the children’s socialization. If the dialogue is construc-
tive, it enriches the religious repertoire of the family. However, from the per-
spective of the involved individuals, the wider horizon of “acceptable” religious 
options may result in a reduced commitment to the particular religious commu-
nity in which they have grown up. A more relaxed attitude towards one’s sym-
bolic heritage is, in the long term, even more counterproductive for the detailed 
and differentiated transmission of religious knowledge and spiritual practices 
to the following generation. One expression of this tendency, present especially 
within ethnically mixed families, is the statement of a leading Jodo Shinshu 
minister in São Paulo who claimed in a 1999 interview that for many younger 
“Nippo-Brazilians” the butsudan has lost its significance. Not fully understood 
in terms of its religious purpose, it is often associated with the esthetically pecu-
liar nostalgic interior of the grandparents home, where it is supposedly main-
tained as an esthetically obsolete and old-fashioned collection of paraphernalia.8
Problems of Maintaining Traditional Japanese Religiosity at the Individual Level 
In the last decades, a disproportionately high percentage of Japanese-Brazilians 
has successfully made use of the opportunities offered by an “emerging” country 
and its institutions of higher education (Adachi 2004). In 1985, 13 percent of 
students and 47 percent of faculty at the University of São Paulo were of Japa-
nese descent (Carvalho 2003, 38). According to the last national census, about 
18 percent of the Brazilian population belongs to the economically privileged 
stratum of society, with a monthly income five times higher than the minimum 
wage, which at the time was more than one thousand, nine hundred Brazilian 
Reais. The percentage of Brazilians of “yellow color” was more than three times 
higher at this income level (55.36 percent). 
This and other similar data prove the following: a) “the extent to which the 
second- or third-generation immigrants have shifted away from the occupation 
and employment patterns of their parents and grandparents” (Carvalho 2003, 
45); b) the identification of younger Japanese descendents with Brazil as their 
8. Quote from my interview with Shaku Riman (Mário Ricardo Gonçalves), 10 March 1999.
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permanent homeland, worthy of a long term “investment” of time and energy in 
the education and training necessary for an individual career that will be remu-
nerated according to the system of gratification inherent in a capitalist, tech-
nological society; and c) their consent to modern principles and values such as 
individualism, rationalism, autonomy and competition.
Against this background, the question of possible causes for the decline of 
“Buddhism of yellow color” in Brazil at the individual level can be answered in 
at least two ways. Firstly, compared with the identity of first generation immi-
grants, the advanced processes of an individual’s “acculturation” and active 
integration of younger descendents into their “host society” corresponds to a 
personality structure in which three relevant components have been recon-
figured according to a new hierarchical order. These are: the self-recognition 
associated with secular existence as a Brazilian, ethnic origin as a Japanese, and 
religious commitment to Buddhism (Chandler 1998). While one can imagine 
that older immigrants saw themselves as Japanese Buddhists who came to Brazil 
by destiny, the younger descendents, although conscious of their Japanese heri-
tage, are Brazilians. Religious heritage remains an issue of identity only for those 
who appear in the IBGE studies as explicitly “Buddhist,” though in the majority 
of such cases, this identity is far from being an internalized “master-status.”
Secondly, adherence to Buddhism is clearly not an obstacle to individual suc-
cess. However, if it is true that—as it has been demonstrated for Umbanda and 
Pentecostalism (Fry and Howe 1975)—the attraction of a religion depends on 
its capacity to address the concrete conflicts experienced by its clientele, then 
one can question the degree to which apparently “otherworldly” oriented Pure 
Land Buddhist currents (based on faith, devotion and hope in the transforma-
tive potential of a merciful transcendent being) cater to a “modern” predisposed 
individual. This individual’s primary concern is his or her professional life “here 
and now,” guided by principles such as rationalism, autonomy and competition 
(Bloom 1998, 46) and who might be better served by a more compatible spiri-
tual practice within the spectrum of new Japanese religions (Mori 1992, 587). 
Conclusion
A detailed look at the statistical data referring to “Buddhism of yellow color” in 
Brazil reveals that the headline “Buddhism is leaving the temples” is perfectly 
adequate, but in a sense contrary to that suggested by the journalists respon-
sible for the quoted article and, hence, to that understood by the average reader. 
Instead of confirming the idea that traditional Buddhism, once exclusively 
attending to the religious necessities of Japanese immigrant families, has began 
to attract a wider audience, the phrase “Buddhism is leaving the temples” alludes 
to a possible future when the facilities of traditional Buddhists communities are 
left empty of local practitioners. In various cases, such an inauspicious scene 
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is already foreshadowed by the constant decline of visitors, as indicated by the 
photo (figure 9), showing a handful of practitioners seemingly “lost” in the quite 
spacious assembly hall of the Zenguenji Temple in Mogi das Cruzes, São Paulo. 
As various statements prove, authorities in the local temples are conscious 
of this precarious situation, but they do not necessarily agree with its evalua-
tion. Seen from a more pessimistic perspective, the currently weakened status 
of traditional Buddhism will continue for quite some time, given that such a 
state is considered symptomatic for a lengthy process of thorough accultura-
tion to new conditions, as was the case for the historically complex circum-
stances under which Buddhism was once transplanted to Japan and China. 
Seen in a more optimistic light, signs of improvement are already visible, for 
example the creation of the national umbrella organization Colegiado Budista 
Brasileiro and the active involvement of traditional Japanese Buddhist currents 
in this organization, reflecting efforts to stimulate the engagement of younger 
Japanese descendents in Buddhist communities (Gonçalves 2005, 206–207). 
It may be a relief for the leaders of traditional Japanese Buddhist authorities 
in Brazil that the statistical decline of the communities of “Buddhists of yellow 
color” is not restricted to Brazil, but a tendency also observable in the United 
States. While this negative trend is less accentuated in ethnically-rooted North 
American Zen temples (Asai and Williams 1999), Shin Buddhist institutions 
figure 9. 2007 Calendar (photo for January), distributed by the  
Buddhist Community Soto Zenshu of  South America
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have suffered from the same problems as their “sister” communities in Brazil 
(Bloom 1998; Tanaka 1999). In both countries religious activities were con-
centrated on the needs of the ethnic community. Here and there the Japanese 
language continues to play a key role in the temples, at the cost of alienating 
members and sympathizers who do not understand it. There is also the com-
mon problem of aging clergy and the difficulty of replacing retired ministers 
with younger Japanese descendents willing to sacrifice their professional ambi-
tions and inner-worldly success for the maintenance of the religious tradition of 
their forefathers. In both Brazilian and North American temples, the hierarchi-
cal structure and the importance of the nuclear family as the basic religious unit 
are in tension with egalitarian principles and with the individualism fostered by 
a modern democratic society. Finally, in both countries, Japanese Buddhism is 
confronted with its image as a foreign religion, with the consequence that the 
number of converts remains insignificant.
However, while it seems that Japanese Buddhist authorities in Brazil often 
face the crisis too passively, North American Shin Buddhists have taken at least 
two initiatives to make a virtue out of necessity (Bloom 1998). The first initia-
tive consists of “Americanization” at the national administrational level, leading 
to more effective ecumenical interchange and more competent participation in 
the political sphere. Secondly, motivated by signs of a kind of “ethnic revival,” 
temple authorities are focusing on members of the youngest/newest genera-
tion of Japanese descendents, seeking to strengthen their commitment to their 
religious community, rather than dispersing resources for the propagation of 
their faith to a wider audience. One strategy in this context is the increase in 
so-called “dharma schools” associated with local temples, including the design 
and promotion of study-material more in tune with the current zeitgeist. This 
striving for ideological change is best illustrated by the emphasis on the egalitar-
ian character of Buddhism and, vice versa, of the relativization of the religious 
importance of traditional Japanese patterns of social behavior. 
Whether these measures will be adequate for the survival of Japanese Bud-
dhist communities in the US remains a mystery. Even less certain is if they will 
work for Brazil. Whatever measures will be taken, the future of “Buddhism of 
yellow color” in Brazil will continue to be an intriguing field of study. 
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